Skip to content

Security & Isolation

Core requirements

I1-B3 adds a database-level isolation boundary: tenant-owned PostgreSQL tables use tenant_id plus Row-Level Security, with trusted transaction-local tenant context. RLS is defense in depth and does not replace application authorization.

  • Every tenant-owned request resolves a trusted TenantContext from hostname/site/API credential and authenticated membership—not from arbitrary body/query values.
  • Authorization evaluates platform role, tenant membership, business-unit scope and entitlement separately.
  • Background jobs carry immutable tenant/site/business-unit identifiers and re-establish authorization context deliberately.
  • Secrets never live in page/component JSON or ordinary integration configuration fields.
  • Payment and advertising credentials use encrypted secret storage/reference tokens.
  • Custom-site API credentials are scoped, revocable and origin/environment constrained where applicable.
  • Admin impersonation/support access is explicit, time-bounded where possible, and fully audited.
  • File/media authorization prevents cross-tenant object discovery.
  • Rate limits differ by public, authenticated, admin and integration surfaces.

Security zones

Public visitor -> Public API -> tenant/site scoped read + conversion commands
Tenant user    -> Tenant API -> membership + permission + BU/site scope
Platform staff -> Platform API -> platform authorization + audit
Custom site    -> Public/headless API -> Custom contract + scoped API client

Sensitive mutations requiring audit

  • role/membership changes;
  • plan/entitlement overrides;
  • domain verification/activation;
  • payment/refund/withdrawal changes;
  • pricing/availability overrides;
  • booking status overrides;
  • site publication/rollback;
  • integration credential changes;
  • advertising campaign state/budget changes;
  • support impersonation.

Database privilege separation — I1-B3

Normal application requests use tenant-scoped runtime database credentials/paths with RLS enforced.

Privileged migration and explicitly authorized platform operations use separate credentials/paths. Privileged access must be narrow, observable and must not be reused as the normal tenant application connection.

Application authorization remains responsible for membership, role, Business Unit/Site scope and entitlement checks even when RLS permits tenant-level row access.

Authentication & identity — I1-B4

Keycloak 26.x is the platform identity provider for human authentication. Touriffique uses OIDC Authorization Code + PKCE for browser sign-in.

Touriffique does not use realm-per-tenant identity isolation. A single environment-level realm authenticates global Users, while tenant membership and authorization remain application-owned.

Password/direct-grant and implicit flows are forbidden for Touriffique applications.

The authoritative identity mapping key is the external OIDC issuer + subject pair, not email address.

Authorization — I1-B4

Authorization is application-owned and evaluates independent dimensions:

authentication
membership / platform-staff assignment
permission
resource scope
entitlement
domain policy

Roles are permission bundles. Application code must not rely on hard-coded role-name equality when a permission check is the intended rule.

Initial grants are allow-only/default-deny.

Tenant role assignments can be scoped to Tenant, Business Unit, Site or Location.

Platform staff permissions are maintained outside TenantMemberships.

MFA — I1-B4

MFA is mandatory for all platform staff and tenant staff.

Customer MFA is optional initially.

Passkeys/WebAuthn are preferred, TOTP is an accepted fallback, and account recovery must not weaken the assurance policy silently.

Sensitive operations may require step-up authentication.

Browser token protection — I1-B4

Durable authentication credentials, especially refresh/session credentials, must not be stored in JavaScript-readable browser persistence such as localStorage, sessionStorage or IndexedDB.

The exact server-session/BFF implementation for Tenant Admin and Platform Admin is deferred to the frontend technology gate.

Machine identities — I1-B4

Trusted server-to-server clients use OAuth 2.0 Client Credentials with Touriffique-owned application scope records.

Provider webhooks continue to use provider-specific verification/signature contracts rather than pretending to be human OAuth clients.